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State-dependent pricing (SDP) models treat the timing of price changes as 
a profit-maximizing choice, symmetrically with other decisions of firms. Using 
quantitative general equilibrium models that incorporate a “generalized (S,s) 
approach,” we investigate the implications of SDP for topics in two major 
areas of macroeconomic research: the early 1990s SDP literature and more 
recent work on persistence mechanisms. First, we show that state-dependent 
pricing leads to unusual macroeconomic dynamics, which occur because of the 
timing of price adjustments chosen by firms as in the earlier literature. In 
particular, we display an example in which output responses peak at about a 
year, while inflation responses peak at about two years after the shock. Second, 
we examine whether the persistence-enhancing effects of two New Keynesian 
model features, namely, specific factor markets and variable elasticity demand 
curves, depend importantly on whether pricing is state dependent. In an SDP 
setting, we provide examples in which specific factor markets perversely work 
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State-dependent pricing models have long been viewed as a desirable vehicle for
macroeconomic analysis because these models treat the timing of price changes as
ap r o ﬁt-maximizing choice. SDP models make it possible to explore how the fre-
quency of price changes responds to variations in model features, such as the form
of the monetary policy rule, and to develop the implications of altered adjustment
timing for the evolution of other macroeconomic variables. Yet, most macroeconomic
investigations employ models with time-dependent pricing (TDP) for two reasons.
First, until recently, it has not been possible to construct operational SDP models,
frameworks in which the eﬀects of alternative structural features could be explored or
that could be readily taken to the data. By contrast, TDP models have proven to be a
workhorse for both purposes. Second, macroeconomists have been unsure if incorpo-
rating state-dependent pricing behavior would have implications for the dynamics of
economic models. Some have speculated that it would be relatively inconsequential in
many contexts to adopt SDP rather than the more easily solved TDP setup. Others
have expressed the view that incorporating state-dependence is unnecessary because
the frequency of price changes does not vary much, at least in moderate inﬂations.
Using a battery of quantitative general equilibrium models developed along the
lines of Dotsey, King, and Wolman [1999], we show that SDP modeling makes a
diﬀerence in terms of model implications within two major areas of macroeconomic
literature. First, as suggested by the 1990s literature — which made use of very dif-
ferent models — we show that there can be a quantitatively important eﬀect of state-
dependent pricing for economic outcomes under steady inﬂation and in response to
monetary shocks. State-dependent pricing leads to novel macroeconomic dynamics,
including a change in the lead-lag structure of output and inﬂation. In particular,
we display an example in which output responses peak at about a year, while inﬂa-
tion peaks at about two years, in line with Friedman’s [1992] summary of dynamic
responses for the U.S. and other countries. Such dynamic responses have not previ-
ously been obtained in sticky price models, as stressed by Mankiw [2001], and the
response depends critically on the price adjustment pattern endogenously chosen by
ﬁrms. Second, it has been shown that speciﬁc factor markets and variable elasticity
demand curves generate more persistent output eﬀects of monetary shocks because
they moderate the size of price changes that ﬁrms make. We investigate whether
these results are sensitive to the incorporation of state-dependent pricing. We ﬁnd
that they can be: speciﬁc factor markets perversely work to lower persistence in the
face of state-dependent pricing, while variable elasticity demand continues to raise it.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides
a little background on the literatures related to this paper. Section 3 describes the
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that we employ in the paper.
The next two sections of the paper provide our core ﬁndings. Section 4 evaluates
whether modern quantitative state-dependent models have the four key implications
2highlighted by the early 1990s SDP literature. Section 5 evaluates the consequences of
SDP for the two persistence-enhancing mechanisms stressed by some New Keynesian
economists. The common ﬁnding of sections 4 and 5 is that state-dependent pricing
has a rich set of implications for the dynamics of macroeconomic models, which diﬀer
substantially from those of time-dependent models.1
2 A little background
We begin by providing a quick overview of the two literatures on which we build.2
2.1 The early 1990s literature on state-dependent pricing
A decade ago, macroeconomists viewed dynamic models with state-dependent pric-
ing as having very diﬀerent implications from time-dependent models. For example,
the inﬂuential textbook of Blanchard and Fischer [1989] reviewed a number of state-
dependent pricing models and stressed how diﬀerent the conclusions from SDP models
were from TDP models, particularly in terms of the eﬀects of monetary disturbances
on real activity. Further contributions, published shortly after the textbook, increased
the perceived discrepancy between time and state-dependent pricing models. Taken
together, these developments through the early 1990s suggested the following ideas:
(1) The steady-state pattern of price adjustment depends importantly on the nature of
the demand and cost functions of the ﬁrm (Sheshinki and Weiss [1977,1983]); (2) The
dynamic eﬀect of money on output within state-dependent pricing models is dramat-
ically diﬀerent from that in time-dependent models, possibly involving complicated
cyclical adjustment processes and nonlinear responses (Caplin and Leahy [1991]); (3)
The evolution of the price level is substantially aﬀected by the adjustment strategies
of ﬁrms interacting with heterogeneous prices (Caballero and Engel [1993]); and (4)
Multiple equilibria can readily arise in state-dependent pricing models because of
complementarities in price-setting, even with the type of exogenous money stock rule
1We are pleased to have contributed this work to this volume and to have presented it at the
April 2004 Carnegie-Rochester conference in honor of Alan Stockman, “The Economics of Exchange
Rates” and the resulting conference volume. Comparing our title and that of the conference, a
reader may plausibly wonder if there has been some mistake and our paper has accidentally fallen
into the wrong collection. But we do not think that Alan will think so, since he has long argued
in various conference discussions that it is important to incorporate state-dependent pricing into
open economy modeling. In the last decade, research on “the new open economy macroeconomics”
has explored the implications of sticky prices for the behavior of exchange rates. That literature
has nearly exclusively concentrated on time-dependent pricing models. (The only exception we
know is Landry [2003]). Our results suggest that the NOEM literature, by concentrating on time-
dependent pricing models, may have missed some important dynamic implications of price-stickiness
and reached inappropriate conclusions about the implications of structural features of models.
2The weblink at http://people.bu.edu/rking makes GAUSS and MATLAB code available to those
interested in replicating and extending this research.
3that nearly always guarantees a unique equilibrium in time-dependent models (Ball
and Romer [1991]).
Accordingly, our ﬁrst objective in this paper is to evaluate whether these core ideas
remain as features in dynamic general equilibrium analysis, with speciﬁce m p h a s i s
on the eﬀects of monetary shocks. Using a basic general equilibrium model, we ﬁnd
support for all of the core ideas from the early 1990s SDP literature.3
2.2 Recent work on output responses to monetary shocks
Within the last decade, there has been substantial research into the eﬀects of mon-
etary shocks and monetary policy rules within macroeconomic models that incorpo-
rate time-dependent pricing, most frequently along the lines of Taylor [1980] or Calvo
[1983]. By contrast, there has been relatively little research on these topics within
state-dependent pricing models. Initially, this was because state-dependent pricing
models were not operational: it was diﬃcult to solve them under general assumptions
about the processes driving economic activity. But the Dotsey, King, and Wolman
[1999] state-dependent pricing model provides one laboratory where these questions
can be addressed.
One major focus of the recent literature on time-dependent models has been a
“search for persistence mechanisms”, in response to Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan’s
[ 2 0 0 0 ]p r o v o c a t i v ec r i t i q u eo fT a y l o r - s t y l ep r i c i n gm o d e l s . W el o o ka tt w op r o m i -
nent ideas in the literature on New Keynesian macroeconomics: that there are fac-
tor markets speciﬁc to individual ﬁrms (Ball and Romer [1990], Kimball [1995] and
Rotemberg [1996]) and that ﬁrms may face non constant elasticity demand curves
that are of a “smoothed oﬀ kink” form (Ball and Romer [1990] and Kimball [1995]).
The basic idea is that each of these mechanisms should moderate the magnitude of
price adjustments that a ﬁrm would like to make, relative to those in a benchmark
setting with ﬂexible factors and a constant elasticity demand, thus making the price
level response more sluggish and the nonneutrality of money more protracted.
In particular, we ask whether these New Keynesian mechanisms lead to increases
in persistence that survive the introduction of state-dependent pricing. We ﬁnd that
there are very diﬀerent conclusions for these two models. Within our state-dependent
pricing framework, the introduction of local factor markets leads to more rapid price
adjustment in the face of steady-state inﬂation and also more rapid adjustment in
response to monetary shocks. Accordingly, time-dependent models that stress this
mechanism are implicitly relying on very large costs of price adjustment in order
to generate persistence. The variable demand elasticity speciﬁcation works quite
diﬀerently. First, in a steady state, this model produces more rapid adjustment —
at given adjustment costs—than its constant elasticity counterpart. Second, in re-
sponse to a monetary shock, this model produces slower adjustment initially than its
3There is one exception: our use of linear approximation methods makes it impossible for us to
explore the implications of nonlinearities.
4constant elasticity counterpart. Taking these two eﬀects together, we ﬁnd that the
variable demand elasticity model enhances persistence in a state-dependent pricing
environment.
3D S G E m o d e l s
We construct and study four models designed to be representative of much recent
work in New Keynesian macroeconomics: production is linear in labor input; con-
sumption and labor eﬀort are separable in utility, and aggregate demand is governed
by the quantity theory of money.4 Thus, the only sophisticated element is the state-
dependent pricing mechanism. While use of such simple models is limiting on some
dimensions, it allows us to clearly illustrate the implications of state dependence for
standard modeling. The four related models are as follows. Model I assumes that
there is constant elasticity demand as in Dixit-Stiglitz [1977] and that there is a global
labor market, two assumptions that allow for ready aggregation.5 Model II allows for
a variable demand elasticity, structured so that there is a “smoothed oﬀ”k i n ki nt h e
demand curve as suggested by Kimball [1995]. Models III and IV assume that there
is a local labor market, a device used by authors such as Ball and Romer [1991].
3.1 The demand aggregator
Firms facing a declining demand elasticity will be less aggressive in pricing, as in
the classic textbook discussion of a kinked demand curve. To develop a speciﬁc
aggregator of the class suggested by Kimball [1995], we consider a general expenditure








D(c(i)/c)di =1 , (1)
where c is the total consumption aggregator implicitly deﬁned by the demand aggre-
gator D, which is an increasing concave function, and where P(i) is the nominal price
charged by the ith ﬁrm on the unit interval.















Λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. For aggregators of the Kimball
class, the ﬁrst order condition can be solved to yield demand curves of the form
4Relative to our work in Dotsey and King (2001), we therefore abstract from investment and
capital formation; from variable utilization; and features of household preferences and constraints
that rationalize separate choices of hours and employment or provide motivations for simultaneously
varying consumption and hours. We also abstract from the structural features that give rise to money
demand.
5This is a standard set of assumptions in work on quantitative dynamic models beginning with
King and Wolman [1996] and Yun [1996].
5c(i)/c = d(
P(i)
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Our speciﬁc aggregator: We use a functional form for D that generates demand
curves that are more elastic for ﬁrms that adjust their price than for ﬁrms whose




[(1 + η)x − η]




O n en i c ep r o p e r t yo ft h i ss p e c i ﬁcation is that the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator is a special













1/(γ−1) + η]. (2)
i.e., they are the sum of a constant elasticity demand augmented by a constant. The
Lagrange multiplier is given byΛ
P =[
R 1
0 (P(i)/P)γ/(γ−1)di](γ−1)/γ.C o n v e n i e n t l y , t h e















so that it is the sum of a DS and linear aggregator.
Figure 1 displays examples of the type of demand curves that can be generated
with this aggregator. The benchmark case is a Dixit-Stiglitz speciﬁcation with a
demand elasticity of 10 (this involves choosing η =0and 1
γ−1 = −10,s ot h a tγ =0 .9.
Over the range of demand plotted here, this curve appears nearly linear to the eye
in panel A, but panel C conﬁrms that the demand elasticity is constant. To study
a variable elasticity demand curve, we choose the parameter η so that the demand
curve has elasticity 10 at c(i)/c =1 ,w i t hγ then controlling the shape of the curve
at other points.6 In the ﬁgure, we use a value of γ =1 .02, which means that a 1.5
percent increase in price yields a 20 percent decrease in demand, which is intermediate
between assumptions made by Kimball [1995] and Bergin and Feenstra [2000]. The
marginal revenue schedules are plotted in panel B. The elasticity implications are
s h o w ni np a n e lC :w i t hγ =1 .02,a2 0p e r c e n td e c l i n ei no u t p u tm e a n st h a tt h e
elasticity rises from 10 to 25, while a 10 percent rise in output means that the demand
elasticity falls from 10 to 5. Finally, the proﬁt implications at a marginal cost of 0.9
are shown in panel D.
3.2 Firms
We consider two labor market structures: one with global labor markets and the other
where labor is tied to a speciﬁc ﬁrm. In the latter case, we assume that ﬁrms are
6As γ approaches 1 from above, the demand curve becomes increasingly concave.
6small when it comes to assessing marginal cost but large when it comes to pricing.7
3.2.1 Factor demand and marginal cost
Production is linear in labor, y(i)=an(i), where y(i) is the output of an individual
ﬁrm, a is the level of technology, and n(i) is hours worked at a particular ﬁrm. Hence,
real marginal cost, ψt, is given by ψt = wt/a in the case of global factor markets or
by ψt(i)=wt(i)/a in the case of speciﬁc factor markets.
3.2.2 Price setting
Dotsey, King, and Wolman [1999] develop a model of dynamic pricing that can be
readily integrated into a general equilibrium model. It also contains time and state-
dependent pricing speciﬁcations as special cases. Basic features of our approach are:
(i) ﬁrms are monopolistic competitors, facing demand for their product given by (2);
(ii) within each period, some ﬁrms will adjust their price and all adjusting ﬁrms will
choose the same nominal price P∗
t ; (iii) the state of the economy includes a discrete
distribution of ﬁrms, with ﬁrms of type j having last set their price j periods ago at
the level P∗
t−j, so that we refer to j as the vintage of the price and denote the fractions
of ﬁr m sw i t ht h i sp r i c ea sθjt (j =1 ,2,..,J); and (iv) a fraction αjt of vintage j ﬁrms
decides to adjust its price and a fraction 1 − αjt decides not to adjust its price (all
vintage J ﬁrms choose to adjust).8
The fraction of ﬁrms, after adjustment, that have a vintage j price is denoted
ωjt and these fractions play an important role in our analysis because they serve as
weights in various aggregation contexts. The total fraction of adjusting ﬁrms (ω0t)
satisﬁes ω0t =
PJ
j=1 αjtθjt and fractions of ﬁrms ωjt =( 1− αjt) · θjt maintain the
p r i c et h a tt h e yp r e v i o u s l ys e ti np e r i o dt − j. Using these weights, for example, the















Finally, the “beginning of period” fractions are mechanically related to the “end of
period” fractions via θj+1,t+1 = ωjt for j =0 ,1,...,J− 1.
If the adjustment fractions αj are treated as ﬁxed through time, then the model
collapses to Levin [1991], so that it contains Calvo [1983] and Taylor [1980] as special
cases. In this interpretation, αj plays two roles: it is the fraction of ﬁrms given the
opportunity to adjust within a period, and it is also the probability of an individual
ﬁrm being allowed to adjust after j periods, conditional on not having adjusted for
j − 1 periods. Under state-dependent pricing we employ randomized ﬁxed costs of
7The local labor market is not quite the "yeoman farmer" setting, as we allow individual workers
to insure against the consumption risks associated with individual market conditions.
8Since all ﬁrms are in one of these situations,
PJ
i=1 θit =1 .
7adjustment to induce discrete adjustment by individual ﬁrms, while allowing for an
adjustment rate that responds smoothly to the aggregate state of the economy.
In both the time-dependent and state-dependent settings, the ﬁrm’s optimal pric-
ing decision can be described using a dynamic programming approach. For example,
a ﬁrm that last changed its price j periods ago must choose between continuing with a
ﬁxed nominal price, which implies a relative price of pjt,( pjt = P∗
t−j/Pt), and paying
a ﬁxed cost of adjusting its price (ξ). Each j-type ﬁr mh a sav a l u ef u n c t i o no ft h e
form
v(pt,ξt,s t)=m a x {vjt,v 0t} (4)
with












Pt+1,ξt+1,s t+1)] − wtξt
being, respectively, the values if the ﬁrm adjusts (v0t) or does not adjust (vjt).I n
these functions and below, st is a state vector that governs the evolution of the ﬁrm’s
demand and costs and
λt+1
λt is the ratio of future to current marginal utility, which is
the appropriate discount factor. Real proﬁts are given by z(pjt)=[ pjt − ψjt]cjt.
The dynamic program (4) implies that the optimal price satisﬁes an Euler equation
that involves balancing pricing eﬀects on current and expected future proﬁts. That

















Furthermore, for any given state of the economy, there is a unique cutoﬀ value of
the price-adjustment cost for each ﬁrm charging a relative price of p. All ﬁrms that
draw an adjustment cost lower than this cutoﬀ will optimally choose to adjust their
price.9 The endogenous adjustment fraction is determined by the menu cost of the
marginal ﬁrm being just equal to the value gained, i.e.,
ξ(αjt)w0t = v0t − vjt.
I nt h et i m ed e p e n d e n tc a s e ,t h eﬁx e dc o s ti se i t h e rz e r oo ri n ﬁnite depending on when
the ﬁrm last changed its price.
Iterating the Euler equation (5) forward, the optimal relative price, p∗
t,c a nb e






jEt{(ωj,t+,j/ω0,t) · (λt+j/λt) · ψj,t+j ·  j,t+j · ct+j}
PJ−1
j=0 β
jEt{(ωj,t+j/ω0,t) · (λt+j/λt) · ( j,t+j − 1) · (Pt+j/Pt) · ct+j}
, (6)
9As long as the inﬂation rate is nonzero and the maximum adjustment cost is ﬁnite, there will
be a maximum number of periods during which any ﬁrm will leave its price unchanged. Thus, the
state space for this problem is ﬁnite.
8where (ωj,t+,j/ω0,t)=( 1− αj,t+j) · (1 − αj−1,t+j−1) · ... · (1 − α1,t+1) is the probability
of nonadjustment from t through t + j,a n d j,t+j is the elasticity of demand facing
a ﬁrm with relative output of cj,t+j/ct+j.10 A c c o r d i n gt o( 6 ) ,t h eo p t i m a lr e l a t i v e
price is a ﬁxed markup over real marginal cost (p∗ = ε
ε−1ψ) if real marginal cost, the
demand elasticity, and the price level are expected to be constant over time. More
generally, (6) illustrates that the optimal price varies with current and expected future
demands, aggregate price levels, real marginal costs, discount factors, the elasticity of
demand, and adjustment probabilities. Intuitively, ﬁrms know that the price they set
today may also apply in future periods, so the expected state of the economy in those
future periods aﬀects the price that they choose today. If, for example, marginal
cost is expected to be high next period, a ﬁrm will set a high price in the current
period, so as not to sell at a loss next period. Similarly, if the elasticity of demand is
expected to be high next period, the ﬁrm will not raise its price as much in response
to a nominal shock because it will lose a lot of business in the future. The conditional
probability terms (ωj,t+,j/ω0,t) are present in time-dependent models, but they are
not time-varying. In our setup, these conditional probability terms eﬀectively modify
the discount factor in a time-varying manner: a high probability of adjustment in
some future period leads the ﬁrm to set a price that heavily discounts the eﬀects on
proﬁts beyond that period.
3.3 The household
We want to have a household objective function that does not change radically when
we consider local labor markets. Therefore, as in Dotsey and King (2001), we assume
that idiosyncratic risks are pooled by households, so that they behave as if there
is a super-household that chooses consumption and labor for each of its members.
This avoids the potential complication of diﬀerential wealth among individuals that
would arise when workers are tied to speciﬁc ﬁrms. The uniﬁed household approach



























where cj and nj are the consumption and labor eﬀort of a household member work-
i n gf o rat y p ejﬁrm, and zjt is the proﬁts remitted to the household by a type j
10The pricing restriction (6) is a natural generalization of the type derived in time-dependent
settings with exogenous adjustment probabilities that are constant through time as in Calvo [1983]
(see, for example, King and Wolman [1996] and Yun [1996]). If the aggregator takes on a constant
elasticity of substitution form, then the optimal pricing (in equation (6)) becomes the familiar
expression found in Dotsey et al. (1999).
9ﬁrm. In this setting—full insurance and utility that is separable in labor eﬀort and
consumption—all households consume the same amount, ct. The ﬁrst order condition







−1 is the Frisch labor supply elasticity.
We further impose the money demand relationship Mt/Pt = ct. Ultimately, the
level of nominal aggregate demand is governed by this relationship along with the
central bank’s supply of money.
3.4 Monetary policy and market clearing
The model is closed by assuming that nominal money supply growth follows an au-
toregressive process,
∆Mt = ρ∆Mt−1 + mt,
where m is i.i.d. and normally distributed. Depending on the structure of factor
markets, equilibrium involves either a wage rate or a vector of wage rates that clear
the labor market while simultaneously implying utility maximization and cost min-
imization. Further, the aggregate price level is such that the money demand equals
money supply, and individual ﬁrms’ prices are value maximizing.11
4 Evaluating predictions about SDP
We now evaluate whether the predictions of the early 1990s literature carry over to
our dynamic general equilibrium setting. Throughout this section, we assume that
the adjustment cost parameters are such that there is an approximately quadratic
hazard function, in a sense made more speciﬁc below. In this section, we also restrict
attention to the models in which there is a global labor market, so that there is a
single real wage wt.
We choose preference parameter values that produce a low elasticity of marginal
cost with respect to real output, assuming that σ =0 .25 and φ =0 .05 implying
that the marginal cost elasticity is about 0.30.12 Many studies in the early 1990s
literature explicitly or implicitly assumed low elasticities of marginal cost with respect
to output. For example, in their analyses of real rigidity [1990] and multiple equilibria
11There is no barrier to considering alternative monetary policy rules, such as interest rate rules,
in our setting. However, we stick with the money supply rule for comparability with the results of
other studies.
12Given that the household eﬃciency condition is wt = cσ
t n
φ
t , given that consumption is equal to
output, and given that labor is approximately equal to output, the elasticity is approximately σ+φ..
10[1991], Ball and Romer assumed explicitly that utility was linear in consumption
(σ =0 ) and that utility was close to linear in work (φ was small).13
4.1 Adjustment timing and the age distribution of prices
The ﬁrst two predictions comes from Sheshinski-Weiss [1977, 1983]: (i) relatively
small menu costs may lead ﬁrms to adopt lengthy periods of price inactivity within an
inﬂationary steady state; and (ii) the shape of the ﬁrm’s demand and cost conditions
will be important for its frequency of price adjustment.
Figure 2 displays the hazard rates at an annual rate of 4 percent inﬂation for
model I (Dixit-Stiglitz demand) and model II (Kimball kinked demand).14 To begin,
note that the chosen adjustment cost structure indeed leads to steady-state hazard
functions that are roughly quadratic in the log relative price deviation, since log
(P∗
t ) − log(P∗
t−j)=j log(π), where π is the steady-state inﬂation rate. The ﬁgure
illustrates that the structure of demand and cost has a quantitatively important
eﬀect on hazard rates. Firms choose to adjust more frequently if there is a kinked
demand curve. The average age of a price in the global DS model is 3.9 quarters and
it is 2.2 quarters in the global K model. The expected duration of price ﬁxity is about
8 quarters in the global DS model and it is 4.8 quarters in the global K model.15
The maximum adjustment cost is about 7.5 percent of production time in both
of these economies, which is quite large (we call the fraction of total time devoted to
price adjustment B and set it to B =0 .015: since the steady-state fraction of time
that individuals devote to market work is n =0 .20, it follows that the adjustment cost
is 7.5 percent of production work). However, because the highest adjustment cost is
rarely paid, the average level of adjustment costs is only .42 percent of production
time in model I (DS-global) and it is 0.86 percent of production time in model II
(K-global), which are much smaller numbers. Another way of thinking about the
magnitude of these costs is to measure the resources spent adjusting prices relative
to sales, which is sometimes measured in the empirical literature on price adjustment
costs: these are 0.37 percent and0 .78percent, respectively, for the two economies.
13Additional calibration information is as follows. First, we assume that there is a demand elastic-
ity of 10 at the relative price of 1. With DS demand, this pins down ε = −10. With the K demand,
we assume that γ =1 .02, leading to the demand speciﬁcation displayed in Figure 1.
14Both of the demand models we study in this section satisfy a condition developed by Sheshinksi
and Weiss, which is that p∂z
∂p is decreasing in p. In their framework, this condition must be imposed
if a higher rate of inﬂation is to increase the frequency of price adjustment.
15The two features are calculated as follows. First, the average age of price is just
PJ−1
j=0 j ∗ ωj,






ω0. In this expression, the probability of a price “surviving” until age j is
ωj
ω0 =
(1 − α1)(1 − α2)...(1 − αj) so that the expression is the sum of the survival probabilities times
the additional length of price ﬁxity (1) that derives from each survival. But since the survival
probabilities sum to one, there is a particularly simple form of this expression.
11Figure 3 helps us understand why there is more rapid price adjustment in the
e c o n o m yw i t hK - d e m a n dt h a nw i t hD S - d e m a n d :a saf u n c t i o no ft h eﬁrm’s relative
price, proﬁts decline much more sharply when there are deviations of price from the
p =1value that would be optimal in the absence of adjustment costs. The solid and
dashed lines in each respective case are the value for all possible prices, while the
stars and circles correspond to the prices actually chosen by the ﬁrm in the steady
state.
4.2 Dynamic eﬀects of monetary shocks
In the early 1990s literature on state-dependent pricing, Caplin and Leahy [1991]
suggested that there would be strikingly diﬀerent dynamics with endogenous timing
of adjustment, in which the evolving distribution would play a critical role. In this
s e c t i o n ,w el o o ka tt h ed y n a m i cr e s p o n s eo fo u t p u tt oa ni n c r e a s ei nt h el e v e lo ft h e
money stock, which rises on impact by 1 percent and then gradually increases to 2
percent above its initial value.16
4.2.1 Model I: SDP dynamics with constant elasticity demand
The tendency for “front-loading” of price adjustments has been a much-discussed
feature of sticky price models: if a ﬁrm expects the price level to increase in the
future and if the ﬁrm expects to hold its nominal price ﬁxed for a substantial time,
then it will aggressively adjust its price in response to the expected future inﬂation. In
Figure 4, it is clear that front-loading carries over to an SDP environment: the “reset
price,” which is the price set by adjusting ﬁrms, increases more than one-for-one with
both the money stock and the price level.17
T h eS D Pe n v i r o n m e n ta l s oi n v o l v e sd y n a m i c st h a ta r ev e r yd i ﬀerent from those
in time-dependent models of the Taylor-Calvo-Levin form. Notably, there are com-
plicated oscillatory dynamics in the price level, output, labor, marginal cost, and
inﬂa t i o n .I nf a c t ,af a i rr e a c t i o nt ot h e s ed y n a m i c si st h a tt h e ya r ev e r yf a rf r o ma n y
estimates that derive from vector autoregressions or other methods of tracing out
empirical responses to monetary changes. But just as with the dynamic responses
derived analytically by Caplin-Leahy [1991], which were also far from such empirical
estimates, they illustrate that SDP models can deliver dramatically diﬀerent dynam-
ics for output and other variables than those in standard time-dependent models.
4.2.2 Model II: SDP dynamics with kinked demand
We next consider the eﬀect of the same monetary shock in a setting with a “smoothed
oﬀ kinked-demand curve” along the lines suggested by Kimball [1995]. There are
16That is, there is a value of ρ =0 .5 in the money supply speciﬁcation.
17The reset price can increase by substantially more than the price level because only a fraction
of the ﬁrms are adjusting prices.
12very diﬀerent dynamic responses displayed in Figure 5. Notably, in contrast to the
DS model of the last subsection, the reset price is much less responsive under this
speciﬁcation: there is no “front-loading” of price adjustments. There are two very
intriguing features. First, the stimulation of real activity lasts for about 10 quarters,
but is now followed by a period of real contraction, which lasts for a substantial
period but does not undo the eﬀect of the initial stimulation. Second, while the real
expansion of economic activity peaks after four quarters, the peak eﬀect on inﬂation
occurs much later.
These dynamics are not so evidentially at variance with various kinds of macro-
economic evidence.18 First, in a critique of TDP sticky price models, Mankiw [2001]
has argued that any macroeconomic model of the Phillips curve must produce a de-
layed surge in inﬂation that follows an initial real stimulation of economic activity. He
uses this set of observations to critique standard New Keynesian sticky price models
with Calvo price-setting. However, our simple state-dependent pricing model out-
comes are reminiscent of Friedman’s [1992] description of the dynamic eﬀects of a
change in money growth and they are also broadly consistent with Mankiw’s descrip-
tion. Speciﬁcally, in response to a monetary shock, Friedman stressed that output
responds before inﬂation. He also suggested that the output response is delayed by
about six to nine months and is distributed over time.
In model II, the response of inﬂation is also distributed over time, but it occurs
w i t hm o r eo fal a g—u pt o1 2t o1 8m o n t h s .W i t hr e s p e c tt oo u t p u t ,w ed on o tp r o -
duce the real activity delays that Friedman describes, although output in our model
does take two to three quarters before achieving its maximal response. Signiﬁcantly,
however, the response of model inﬂation is delayed and does not peak until about six
quarters.
4.2.3 Contrasting SDP with TDP in the kinked demand case
We now contrast the SDP model with a very speciﬁc TDP alternative, which we think
is a natural benchmark: we use a TDP model that has exactly the same steady-state
as the SDP model studied in Figure 5, but we freeze the adjustment rates at their
steady state values. Diﬀerences between the dynamic responses, as reported in Figure
6, then are attributable to whether adjustment rates vary in the face of a monetary
shock. First, the price level increases at about the same rate in the TDP (solid
line) and SDP (dashed line) models during the ﬁrst year, but then it increases more
rapidly in the SDP model, leading to a surge in inﬂation during the second year. (The
‘reset price’ under TDP is marked with a ‘♦’, while that under SDP is marked with
an ‘¤’). Second, the oscillatory dynamics are attributable to changes in the rate of
adjustment, since they are not present in the TDP variant.
18Anyone who has estimated vector autoregressions knows that there are many speciﬁcations that
show monetary disturbances having an initial positive eﬀect on real economic activity and then a
negative one (although speciﬁcation selection means that fewer of these are reported than estimated).
134.2.4 Understanding the incentives for adjustment
What are the incentives for price adjustment in the dynamic models? At one level,
the answer is easy: there is a greater rate of adjustment if there is a greater value to
adjusting. However, the determinants of v0t −vjt are complicated, within and across
the DS and K-demand models. Accordingly, we start here by focusing directly on a
measure of one-period proﬁt, which is revealing about the diﬀerence in adjustment
incentives. We then discuss aspects of a dynamic decomposition for the K-demand
case. Finally, we consider the evolution of the price level once again, displaying the
importance of adjustment timing quantitatively.
Contrasting adjustment incentives: a static perspective To begin, we note
that a rise in output and an associated increase in marginal cost are important features
of Figure 5. We therefore start by looking at a measure of the static gain to price
adjustment in the face of a 1 percent rise in real marginal cost, deﬁned as
z(p∗,ψ) − z(p,ψ)
z
where z(p,ψ)=pd(p)−ψd(p); z(p∗,ψ) is the level of proﬁts at the statically optimal
price; and z = z(1,ψ= ε−1
ε ) is the level of proﬁt under fully ﬂexible prices.
W eb e g i nb yg r a p h i n gt h i sm e a s u r ea st h ed a s h e dl i n ei nF i g u r e7f o rt h eK -
demand model. First, the price p∗ is just above one because the ﬁrm faces the
rapidly declining proﬁt illustrated in Figure 3, and thus, a ﬁrm that is free to raise its
price will not do so by very much in the face of the increase in marginal cost. Second,
given the desirability of a small adjustment, it is intuitive that there is also a small
loss of maintaining price p =1 , the price that would be optimal in the absence of
the rise in marginal cost. Hence, in the kinked demand world, a ﬁrm with p =1also
has only a small incentive to pay a ﬁxed cost to adjust its price. However, should
i t sp r i c ed e v i a t es i g n i ﬁcantly from p =1 ,t h e nt h eﬁr mf a c i n gak i n k e dd e m a n dh a s
a large incentive to adjust: this was the feature that led to more rapid steady-state
adjustment under K-demand in Figure 2 above.
We also ﬁnd the ﬁgure helpful in thinking about why there are larger incentives for
price adjustment in response to a rise in marginal cost with DS-demand rather than
K-demand: the DS model leads to larger desired price adjustments and therefore
larger gains to adjustment near p =1 . But it leads to relatively smaller eﬀects
with large departures from p =1 , so that it is also compatible with more extended
stickiness in the steady state.
A dynamic perspective on the adjustment with kinked demand The ad-
justment rate for a ﬁrm of vintage j is implicitly given by ξ(αjt)w0t = v0t − vjt.





] ∗ [log(pjt) − log(pj)] + other terms
so that it is possible to explore the eﬀects of the price level on adjustment incentives,
holding ﬁxed other factors. Speciﬁcally, we take the equilibrium solution for log(pjt)−
log(pj) and then construct a synthetic series e αjt−αj using the equation above. Given
these synthetic series, we can also construct a synthetic series for the vintages, e ωjt−ωj,
which is a dynamic simulation of sorts since it obeys the dynamic equations
e ωjt − ωj =( 1 − αj)(e ωj−1,t−1 − ωj) − ωj−1(e αjt − αj)
e ω0t − ω0 =
J−1 X
j=0
[αj(e ωj−1,t−1 − ωj)+ωj(e αjt − αj)].
That is, the synthetic series for e ωjt is constructed solely on the basis of variations
in the synthetic adjustment rates {e αjt}j,t, so that it too involves only the eﬀects of
pjt. W eh a v eu n d e r t a k e nt h i sd e c o m p o s i t i o na n dh a v ef o u n dt h a te ﬀects of pjt are
dominant on αjt — in the sense of high R2 — except for those ﬁrms that just adjusted.
The price eﬀects capture variations in vintage fractions (ωjt) virtually completely.19
The evolution of the price level once again Caballero and Engel [1993] em-
phasized that the behavior of the price level would be inﬂuenced by the interaction of
the evolving distribution of prices and the evolving probability that individual price
adjustments would take place. To explore this channel within our model, we consider
t h em o v e m e n to fal i n e a ra g g r e g a t eo ft h ep r i c el e v e l ,Pt =
PJ−1
j=0 ωjtPjt. This price
level can be decomposed directly into a part
PJ−1
j=0 ωjPjt that is the eﬀect of price
stickiness when steady-state weights are maintained and an additional component PJ−1
j=0(ωjt−ωj)Pjt that derives from the interaction of evolving adjustment rates and
19See Appendix D, for these simulations.The adjustment rate for a ﬁrm of vintage j is implicitly
given by ξ(αjt)w0t = v0t − vjt,w h i c hw ec a nw r i t ea s








Accordingly, it is more generally possible to link variations in adjustment rates to three factors:
proﬁts (zjt); a measure of the urgency of adjustment (v0,t−βEt[
λt+1
λt v0,t+1]); and an “option value"
of adjustment term that involves future adjustment costs. Further, the eﬀects of proﬁtability can
be decomposed into consequences of relative price variations; marginal cost variations; and aggre-
gate demand variations. We have undertaken some exploration of the analytics and quantitative
performance of such measures in our model, but these experiments are not reported because of the
dominance of the eﬀect of the price level on relative prices.











(ωjt − ωj)Pjt (7)
In our framework, we want to calculate a linear decomposition that captures the
elements highlighted by (7). To develop such a linear decomposition, we begin by
noting that the linear aggregate is related to the perfect (exact, nonlinear) price index





Pt ],.D i ﬀerentiating this expression, we ﬁnd that we





































i.e., as the sum of a term that captures the eﬀect of nominal price adjustments at ﬁxed
weights and a term that captures the eﬀects of changes in adjustment probabilities.
Applying this decomposition to the K-demand model, we produce Figure 8.
The top panel of this ﬁgure shows that the exact price level (3) and the linear
aggregator are indistinguishable to the eye in this economy, but that there is an







Pt )]}. Interestingly, this diﬀerence is minuscule during
the ﬁrst few quarters after the monetary shock hits, but it becomes important later
on, rising with inﬂation, as the second panel shows. The background to this panel is
Figure 2, which shows that 22 percent of the ﬁrms in the economy are adjusting each
period in steady-state. The second panel of the ﬁgure shows that this fraction rises by
about 3 percent during the second year after the shock, which is when inﬂation peaks
(adjustment rates here are measured as a deviation from the steady-state level).
On the basis of this analysis, we conclude that this case has strong eﬀects of the
type identiﬁed by Caballero and Engel [1993]: the interaction of the nearly quadratic
hazard, sticky nominal prices, and the price level is at the heart of understanding the
dynamics of inﬂation. Concretely, the delayed response in inﬂation shown in Figure
5 arises because there is initially little movement in the price level, so that ﬁrms have
little incentive to pay to adjust prices. However, as the price level continues to rise,
more ﬁrms have this incentive and their collective action produces a further rise in
the price level, which additionally reinforces the extent of adjustment.
164.3 Multiplicity and nonexistence
Ball and Romer [1991] highlight the possibility of multiple equilibria in basic SDP
models, stressing that changes in the price level can alter the privately optimal pat-
tern of price adjustment for ﬁrms. In our DSGE model, we have found that there
apparently is a substantial part of the parameter space in which there are both multi-
plicity and nonexistence according to the criteria of Blanchard and Kahn [1980]. That
we ﬁnd these regions in the K-demand case is perhaps not too surprising, given the
central role that the price level played in triggering adjustment in the prior section.
In Figure 9, for the K-demand model, we calculate the number of stable eigenval-
u e so ft h ed y n a m i cm o d e la te a c hp o i n ti nag r i do ft h ea d j u s t m e n tc o s tp a r a m e t e r
B — which is the largest value the adjustment cost can be — and the labor utility
parameter φ.I f t h e r e i s a ‘ * ’ i n t h e ﬁgure, it means that there is a unique, stable
rational expectations solution: the number of stable eigenvalues is equal to the num-
ber of predetermined variables. Since we are studying B =0 .015 and φ =0 .05 in the
ﬁgures above, we start by noting that there is a ‘*’ in that location. We also note
that there is a region around this point in which there is uniqueness, but that it is
close to the border with a region of nonexistence. At other points in the ﬁgure, there
are fewer stable eigenvalues than predetermined variables, which implies nonexistence
according to Blanchard-Khan, so that we put an ‘o’ in that location. Finally, there
are points in which there are more stable eigenvalues than predetermined variables,
which implies multiplicity (nonuniqueness) according to Blanchard-Khan, so that we
put a ’♦’ in that location. John and Wolman [2004] have begun the important work
of exploring the conditions under which dynamic multiple equilibria occur in SDP
models, together with providing economic interpretation about these ﬁndings. Their
analysis suggests that this is a complex and subtle topic.
It is important to stress that nonexistence and nonuniqueness do not always arise.
For one example, if we were to produce a version of this ﬁgure for the comparable TDP
model, then all points would be a unique equilibrium: this buttresses the Ball-Romer
idea that multiplicity is related to state dependence. For another, a version of this
ﬁgure for the DS model examined above (demand elasticity =10) would also lead to
uniqueness for all parameter values in this grid. Finally, in exploring both K and DS
models with a global labor market, a higher elasticity of marginal cost to output (over
one) and the adjustment cost distribution similar to that used in DKW [1999], we
also did not ﬁnd nonexistence or nonuniqueness. But in some investigations, nonex-
istence and nonuniqueness can arise for precisely the parameter values that interest
a researcher. For example, we would like to look at adjustment cost speciﬁcations
with a B smaller than 0.015, so as to reduce the extent of steady-state stickiness.
But we cannot because this moves us out of the region of solvability. Moreover, in
exploring SDP model dynamics in the current investigation, we have encountered
— particularly in models with local factor markets — many cases in which there are
apparently multiple equilibria or there is nonexistence. In our experience, Figure 9
is representative in that it suggests that there is indeed a complicated relationship,
17since the relevant regions are discontinuous.
5S p e c i ﬁc factors and persistence
An important line of macroeconomic research has explored the implications of the
various sticky-price model features for the time paths of real and nominal variables,
with one particular topic being the persistence of real eﬀects in the wake of Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan [2000]. Work by Kimball [1995] and Rotemberg [1996] viewed
each ﬁrm as having a pool of workers to draw from as opposed to buying labor in a
competitive market. Hence, even if the ﬁrm purchases labor competitively, it knows
that an increase (decrease) in its demand will raise (lower) the wage rate and it
takes this into account in pricing its product. The intuition behind this result is as
follows. An increase in the current price cuts demand, which lowers marginal cost
when factors are speciﬁc. In turn, the lower marginal cost makes it eﬃcient to price
less aggressively. For this reason, Kimball [1995] and Rotemberg [1996] suggested
there would be increased price sluggishness and persistence if one switches from a
global to local view of factor markets. They also discuss the fact that in setting a low
price, the ﬁrm must balance the fact that there will be high demand in the future and
that this output must be produced at high cost, but they conclude that the overall
eﬀect is to make ﬁrms price less aggressively and to increase price level sluggishness.
We use diﬀerent parameter values to explore this idea. First, we assume that there
is a higher elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output and in particular that
it is about 1.5 (we do this by assuming σ =1and φ =0 .5). Second, since Kimball
and Rotemberg both used Calvo-like models, we assume that there is an adjustment
cost structure that makes the DS-global version into an “approximate Calvo” model
within the steady-state, having an adjustment hazard of about 0.2 for eight quarters
before complete adjustment occurs.20
5.1 The promise
We begin by illustrating the promise of the speciﬁc factors mechanism, calculating the
output impulse responses for an approximate Calvo model and displaying it in Figure
10.21 The dramatic returns to the introduction speciﬁc factors appears in the output
responses of models III and IV, with speciﬁc factors alone (model III) producing
virtually the same persistence as the variable elasticity of demand speciﬁcation (II).22
20We also choose these parameter values — more in line with values used in the real business cycle
literature such as King, Plosser, and Rebelo [1988] — because there is no endogenous persistence in
this case, as emphasized by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan [2000]. Hence, any increase in persistence
will be attributable to speciﬁc factors. The choice also allows us to evaluate whether, as is sometimes
suggested, local factor markets substitute for a low marginal cost elasticity in generating persistence.
21The weights are those from the global DS model developed in the next section.
22In his conference comments, Susanto Basu stressed the symmetry of speciﬁc factors and variable
demand elasticity under Calvo pricing. Thus, our parametric speciﬁcation — although not designed
18The combination of the two New Keynesian mechanisms, as originally suggested by
Kimball, yields a great deal of persistence.
5.2 Approximate Calvo
We want to explore the eﬀects of state dependence within a battery of models that
have an approximate Calvo form, i.e., a steady-state hazard that is roughly constant
for a number of periods. Accordingly, we select the parameters of our cost function
so that there is a ﬂat hazard for the DS-global setting for eight quarters, which is
a “truncated Calvo” steady state. The necessary cost function, ξ(α),i so n et h a ti s
fairly ﬂat until α = .2 then rises very sharply to close to the maximum cost. Faced
with this adjustment cost, ﬁrms with a range of diﬀerent values of (v0 − vj)/w0 will
all choose α =0 .2.W h e n (v0 − vj)/w0 ≥ B =0 .015,t h e na l lﬁrms will choose to
adjust (α =1 ).
With this cost structure in hand, we can explore the eﬀect of changing the struc-
ture of demand and the eﬀect of localizing factors on hazard rates and vintage frac-
tions, as we did previously for the alternative cost speciﬁcation. Figure 11 displays
the results, revealing some worth highlighting. First, as suggested above, the ﬁgure
displays an “approximate Calvo” form of adjustment: the optimal hazard is about 0.2
until full adjustment occurs. Second, in the global factor market setting, as above,
the shift from DS-demand to K-demand lowers the number of periods over which
there is incomplete adjustment by ﬁrms, cutting it from eight in the DS case to four
in the K-demand case. Third, for both of the local market cases, the results are dra-
matic: moving from global to local markets cuts the interval of partial adjustment to
just one period. To understand this, we return to the original intuition from Kimball
[1995] and Rotemberg [1996]: with a ﬁxed hazard, a ﬁrm sets its price relatively less
aggressively than under global markets because it wants to take advantage of low
current marginal cost, which occurs when price is raised above the benchmark value
of one. In doing so, as discussed above, it must balance the fact that there will be
high demand in the future and that this output must be produced at high cost. But
these future periods of low proﬁts — resulting from high demand and high cost occur-
ring together — can be avoided through payment of an adjustment cost, so that the
ﬁrm makes aggressive use of this option in both local market settings. In fact, under
the current parameterization, it keeps prices ﬁxed for only two periods (including the
initial period of price adjustment).
This dramatic implication of very short intervals of price ﬁxity for the DS-local
and K-local models could be altered by assuming larger values of the maximum price
adjustment cost (which is here set equal to 0.015). But, then, the conclusion would be
that models with local factor markets require substantially higher adjustment costs
to obtain a speciﬁed pattern of “near Calvo” adjustment. In fact, in order to produce
price ﬁxity of four periods in the DS case, we must ramp up adjustment costs so that
for this purpose — corresponds to essentially equivalent strength of these two mechanisms.
195.85 percent of labor eﬀo r ti sd e v o t e dt op r i c ec h a n g e sa tac o s to f5 . 5p e r c e n to f
sales. Thus, a TDP pricing model with local labor markets and four vintages of ﬁrms
is ignoring tremendous incentives that ﬁrms have for adjusting their price. This level
of menu costs strikes us as implausible.
5.3 Consequences of endogenous adjustment
With exogenous adjustment timing, there were large gains in persistence from moving
from global to local markets. We now explore the implications of moving from global
to local factor markets with endogenous adjustment timing, using the same cost of
adjustment structure discussed above. Figure 12 displays the eﬀect of moving from a
global to local market under state-dependent pricing with the DS-demand structure
and Figure 13 displays the eﬀect with the K-demand structure: each indicates that
the persistence gain suggested by Figure 10 also turns into a persistence loss under
state-dependent pricing.
Looking across this pair of ﬁgures, it is clear that there is more persistence with
model IV (K-local) than with model III (DS-local). However, more importantly,
this pair of ﬁgures illustrates a principle: economic mechanisms that have one set of
consequences under time-dependent pricing (as in Figure 10) can have a very diﬀerent
set of consequences under state-dependent pricing (as in Figure 12 and 13) because
the mechanisms alter the incentives agents have to adjust the timing of their price
changes.
5.4 The eﬀe c to fK - d e m a n do nd y n a m i c so n c ea g a i n
It is important to stress that persistence is not necessarily reduced when a model
f e a t u r el o w e r st h en u m b e ro fp e r i o d so fp r i c e - ﬁxity in the steady-state, which we
illustrate by considering the global market case under "approximate Calvo" cost
structure of this section. As background, Figure 11 shows that the number of periods
of price-ﬁxity is roughly halved when DS-demand is replaced by K-demand. Figure 14
shows the eﬀects of moving from DS-demand to K-demand on the dynamic response
to a monetary shock (in this diagram, a solid line refers to the K-demand model and
a dashed line refers to the DS model). Despite the smaller number of price vintages,
the K-demand model continues to have the important implication discussed above:
the K-demand makes ﬁrms less aggressive on the pricing front, converting the more
than 2 percent change in the reset price on impact to about a 0.8 percent change in
the reset price on impact. That is, even though the current framework is one with
a higher elasticity of marginal cost to output and a diﬀerent structure of adjustment
costs, the price level still is initially more sluggish than under DS-demand, which
brings about both a larger real output response and a more persistent one.
In terms of the dynamics of the inﬂation rate, the K-demand model also leads to
ap e a ki n ﬂation rate that lags the output peak, although it does so only by one or
20two quarters in this case. However, the change in the adjustment cost function from
one involving a nearly quadratic hazard to one involving a nearly constant hazard
does mean that there is a quite diﬀerent decomposition of the sources of variations
in the price level. If we were to reproduce Figure 8 for the current adjustment cost
structure, then we would ﬁnd that there was only a minuscule diﬀerence between the
various price level measures and a very small change in the fraction of ﬁrms altering
the timing of their price adjustment in the face of the monetary shock.
6 Summary and conclusions
What are the implications of state-dependent pricing models for dynamic macroeco-
nomic modeling? In this paper, we showed that these are rich and varied, working
within a battery of quantitative dynamic general equilibrium models.
We began by investigating whether some of the results of the 1990s literature on
state-dependent pricing carried over to our models, which are constructed along the
lines proposed by Dotsey, King, and Wolman [1999]. This earlier literature reached
the general conclusion that SDP models were very diﬀerent from the more commonly
employed time-dependent pricing models (TDP models). More speciﬁcally, it sug-
gested the following ideas: (1) the steady-state pattern of price adjustment depends
importantly on the nature of the demand and cost functions of the ﬁrm; (2) the
dynamic eﬀect of money on output within state-dependent pricing models is dramat-
ically diﬀerent from that in time-dependent models, possibly involving complicated
cyclical adjustment processes and nonlinear responses; (3) the evolution of the price
level is substantially aﬀected by the adjustment strategies of ﬁrms interacting with
heterogeneous prices; and (4) multiple equilibria can readily arise in state-dependent
pricing models, because of complementarities in price-setting, even with the type of
exogenous money stock rule that nearly always guarantees a unique equilibrium in
time-dependent models. Working with assumptions characteristic of that literature,
speciﬁcally that there is a low elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output and
that there is a hazard function that rises quadratically in a measure of price gaps,
we found support for all of these ideas, except that our use of linear approximation
methods precluded studying nonlinear dynamics. Exploring the dynamic response
of output and inﬂation to monetary shocks in a model with a “smoothed oﬀ kinked
demand curve,” we unexpectedly found a pattern of output and inﬂation dynamics
that has been suggested to be inconsistent with sticky price models: output peaking
after four quarters, and inﬂation peaking nearly a year later.
In evaluating the implications of state-dependent pricing for dynamic macroeco-
nomic models, we also considered issues related to ongoing research into model fea-
tures that can lead to larger persistence of output responses to monetary shocks.
Working with an adjustment cost structure that was designed to produce a relatively
ﬂat hazard function over eight quarters in the reference case of a constant elasticity
demand curve and a global labor market, we found that two model modiﬁcations — a
21variable demand elasticity and a local labor market — led to sharply reduced intervals
of stickiness. The kinked demand curve model had a ﬂat hazard over four quarters
rather than eight; the local labor market models had only one period of incomplete
price adjustment. For this reason, it turned out that the local labor market friction
lowered persistence under SDP rather than raising persistence as it does under TDP.
However, the result for the kinked demand curve was that there was larger persistence
(relative to constant elasticity demand) even though the steady-state duration of price
ﬁxity was smaller under kinked rather than constant elasticity demand. Taken to-
gether, these examples show that state-dependent pricing may alter the conclusions
that a researcher would draw about the eﬀect of structural elements of a model.
In closing their 1989 discussion of state-dependent pricing and time-dependent
pricing, Blanchard and Fischer considered the types of economic exchanges that might
be best modeled using either approach, but they could only summarize a few empiri-
cal studies about price adjustment dynamics (notably Cecchetti [1986] and Kashyap
[1995]). 23, 24 Recent work by Bils and Klenow [2004] and Klenow and Kryvtsov
[2004] is providing valuable new information about the behavior of consumer goods
prices in the U.S., both in terms of the timing and magnitude of adjustments, and
many studies are underway for other countries.25 It is clear from this ongoing work
that the average duration of price ﬁxity diﬀers substantially across industries and
that there are important period-to-period changes in the fractions of goods whose
prices are changed. It is also clear that aspects of this work raise challenges for exist-
ing models of price adjustment, both time-dependent and state-dependent. Learning
further about the general implications of these pricing models for macroeconomic
dynamics, as we have here, will be a central component of the important project of
taking SDP models to data.
23See Willis [2001] for an interesting modern reworking of Cecchetti’s analysis of magazine prices.
24See Wolman [2003] for a comprehensive survey and critical appraisal of a variety of evidence on
duration of price ﬁxity and the magnitude of price adjustment costs.
25Notably, the cooperative project being sponsored by the European Central Bank on Inﬂation
Persistence.
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Figure 1: Alternative Demands: Dixit-Stiglitz (o) and Kimball Kink (*)
























































Figure 2: Adjustment rates (α) and vintage fractions (ω) for global labor market
models with DS demand (o) and K demand (*)



















Figure 3: Proﬁt for DS and K demand at ψ = ε−1
ε = .9








































































Figure 4: Dynamic Responses to a Monetary Shock with DS demand. The three
responses in the ﬁrst panel are the money stock (light line); the price level (dark
line); and the optimal price set by adjusting ﬁrms (♦).





































































Figure 5: Dynamic Responses to a Monetary Shock with K demand. The three
responses in the ﬁrst panel are the money stock (light line); the price level (dark
line); and the optimal price set by adjusting ﬁrms (♦).


























Figure 6: Comparison of TDP (–) and SDP(- -) responses with the K demand
speciﬁcation. In the ﬁrst panel, in addition to the price levels and money stock, the
♦ is the re-set price in the SDP model and the ¤ is the re-set price in the TDP model





























Optimal K price Optimal DS price
Figure 7: Static proﬁts























































Figure 8: Sources of variation in the price level















































Figure 9: Equilibrium: Uniqueness (*), Nonexistence (o) or Multiplicity (♦)



























Figure 10: Introduction of local labor markets or kinked demand (or both) increases
output persistence under time-dependent pricing.
























































Figure 11: Adjustment hazards and vintage fractions under cost distribution leading
to near-constant hazard
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Figure 12: Consequences of localizing labor market under DS demand
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Figure 13: Consequences of localizing labor market under K demand

















K: Money and Prices


















Figure 14: Persistence implications of DS and K demand with endogenous timing of
price adjustment
39Appendices
A State-dependent pricing models
State-dependent pricing models view the timing of adjustment as endogenous, rather
than as a parametric feature of a model economy. Following the early work of
Barro [1972], state-dependent pricing models attracted the attention of a number
of researchers through the early 1990s. But since the models were mathematically
challenging, individual studies chose simplifying assumptions to make the problem
tractable.
A.1 Steady-state adjustment
Ap a i ro fi n ﬂuential studies by Sheshinski and Weiss [1977,1983] provided a detailed
partial equilibrium analysis of the eﬀect of inﬂation on price adjustment in the pres-
ence of ﬁxed costs, working within an economic environment that was otherwise
stationary. Their analyses drew on prior work on optimal discrete adjustment poli-
cies in the presence of ﬁxed costs that began with Scarf’s [1959] work on inventory
adjustment and is sometimes described as the S,s adjustment literature.
In their analyses, a key reference point was the constant relative price — which
we will call p∗—t h a tt h eﬁrm would set in the absence of ﬁxed costs of adjustment.
Analyzing the eﬀects of certain inﬂation within a continuous time framework, SW
[1977] showed that a ﬁrm would adopt a strategy of adjusting its price periodically,
starting at a relative price p>p ∗ and adjusting when inﬂa t i o ne r o d e dt h er e l a t i v e
price to a value p <p ∗. That is: it would set a nominal price that implied a path of
the real price that was initially high in comparison to the frictionless price and then
declined through time as the real value of the nominal price was eroded by inﬂation.
Their analysis showed that an increase in the rate of inﬂation would unambiguously
raise the size of nominal price adjustments (the ratio p/p) and that larger adjustment
costs would also raise p and lower p. However, somewhat surprisingly, their analysis
showed that there must be a restriction on the shape of the proﬁt function for higher
inﬂation to increase the frequency of price adjustment. If z(p,...) is the proﬁt function,
they showed that p
∂z(p,...)
∂p must be decreasing in price for higher inﬂation to have the
expected eﬀect.26 Finally, they reported simulation analyses indicating that — with
a quadratic proﬁtf u n c t i o n—s m a l lﬁx e dc o s t sc a nl e a dt op r i c eﬁxity on the part of
ﬁrms of one to two years, a ﬁnding that they attributed to the proﬁte ﬀects of p = p∗
being small in the neighborhood of p∗.
Working within a setting in which inﬂation was either zero or increased by a
random amount, SW [1983] explored the eﬀect of uncertain inﬂa t i o no nt h eo p t i m a l
26The demand speciﬁcations used in our analysis satisfy these conditions.
40pricing problem, showing that it again took the (S,s) form. They then looked at the
implications of inﬂation uncertainty for the timing and magnitude of price adjust-
ment. The main ﬁnding of the paper was developed by a clever certainty equivalence
argument: the optimal policy under uncertain inﬂation would be of the same form
as under certain inﬂation. All that was necessary to study the eﬀects of uncertain
inﬂation was to determine the particular “certainty equivalent” inﬂation rate, which
they showed depended on the parameters of the stochastic process for inﬂation and
the real interest rate, but not on the shape of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function. Using this
apparatus they explored the eﬀects of increasing the mean and variance of the inﬂa-
tion rate on the values of p and lower p,a sw e l la st h ee x p e c t e dd u r a t i o no fp r i c e
ﬁxity.
A.2 State-dependent pricing and dynamics
While the SW studies focused on the behavior of an individual ﬁrm, the analyses of
Caplin and Spulber [1987] and Caplin and Leahy [1991] focused on the real eﬀects of
money on output within basic general equilibrium models. Delicately balancing rigor
and tractability, CS built a continuous time general equilibrium model that would
maintain the optimality of the (S,s) policies as developed by SW and yet allow for
analysis of aggregates. The CS model involved (i) a demand curve for the ﬁrm’s
output that depended on its relative price and aggregate real balances; (ii) a cost
function for the ﬁrm that depended on the volume of its output; (iii) a price level
that was an aggregate of the prices of individual ﬁrm prices; (iv) a money supply
rule that speciﬁed that the money supply could not decline, but could increase by
a stochastic amount; and (v) an initial uniform distribution of prices relative to the
money stock. Taken together, these ingredients led to a striking result: increases in
the money stock were neutral even though prices were sticky. In essence, this result
occurred because an increase in money would lead the ﬁrms with the lowest relative
prices to re-set their prices at the highest level, causing the price level to rise one-for-
one with the money stock and hence leaving real aggregate demand unaﬀected. This
ﬁnding was dramatically diﬀerent from those arising in time-dependent models.
Caplin and Leahy [1991] reexamined the interaction of money, output, and the
price level within a model that made two important modiﬁcations in the prior analy-
sis of Caplin and Spulber [1987]. CL assumed that the (log) money supply was a
driftless random walk, so that it could either rise or fall. CL also assumed that
ﬁrms followed two-sided adjustment strategies, adjusting their price — normalized by
the money stock— upward if it fell suﬃciently and reducing it if it became too high.
Assuming that there was a uniform distribution of initial prices, they were able to
develop a simple relationship between money, prices, and output, which again dif-
fered substantially from the TDP case and also preserved the uniform distribution.
In essence, there were three regimes. First, if the lowest normalized price was at the
level that triggered an adjustment, then a money supply increase would trigger an
41increase in the price level and be neutral, just as in CS. But if there was a decrease in
the money supply, then all nominal prices would remain unchanged and there would
be a negative eﬀect on real output. Second, if the highest normalized price was at
the level that triggered an adjustment, then a money supply decrease would trigger a
decrease in the price level and be neutral, just as in CS. But if there was a increase in
the money supply, then all nominal prices would remain unchanged and there would
be a positive eﬀect on real output. Third, if neither of the above conditions were
satisﬁed, then no nominal price adjustments would occur and there would be a direct
eﬀect of money on output. The Caplin and Leahy [1991] analysis implied that the
eﬀects of money would depend strongly on the state of the economy, again suggesting
dramatically diﬀerent linkages than in time-dependent pricing models. They stressed
that the evolving distribution of relative prices was a key determinant of the eﬀect of
monetary disturbances and they concluded that it was important to systematically
investigate how such evolving distributions contributed to macroeconomic phenom-
ena. Finally, they also constructed some suggestive sample paths of money, output,
and prices that suggested that SDP dynamic responses would look quite diﬀerent
from the standard responses in TDP models.
A.3 The dynamics of the price level
Caballero and Engel [1993] focused attention on the implications of state-dependent
pricing for the behavior of the price level, working within a simple and yet empirically
rich framework that they applied to U.S. inﬂation data. The upshot of the CE analysis
was two-fold. First, they suggested that price adjustment hazards should be best
viewed as an approximately quadratic function of price gaps.27 Second, they suggested
that the dynamics of the price level would be materially aﬀected by tracking aspects
of the distribution of prices through time owing to the incentives for price adjustment
that this distribution implied for individual ﬁrms. At an annual data frequency, their
estimates suggested that the fraction of ﬁrms adjusting ranged between 49 percent
and 59 percent during the 1960-1990 interval, increasing substantially during the high
inﬂation period in the middle of the sample and particularly in response to changes
in oil prices.
A.4 Multiple Equilibria
Ball and Romer [1991] demonstrated that state-dependent pricing models could dif-
fer signiﬁcantly from time-dependent models in terms of uniqueness of equilibria. In
particular, there was a new possibility of multiple equilibria due to a basic comple-
mentarity in the price-adjustment decisions of ﬁrms: an increase in a given ﬁrm’s
price raises the price level (perhaps only by a very small amount if it acts alone)
27A view that has been implemented in some later work on the evolution of inﬂa t i o ni nS p a n i s h
sectoral data (Estrada and Hernando [1999]).
42w h i c hi nt u r nm a k e si td e s i r a b l ef o ro t h e rﬁrms to raise their price because their
relative prices have fallen. Considering a monetary shock, they showed it could be
individually rational in the presence of a ﬁx e dm e n uc o s tf o raﬁrm not to adjust price
if all others did not adjust and the price level therefore remained constant. They also
showed it could be individually rational for a ﬁrm to change price one-for-one with the
monetary shock if all others did as well. Because such a multiplicity depends critically
on a ﬁrm choosing whether or not to adjust price, it was precluded in time-dependent
models.
B Stochastic adjustment costs
Costs of price adjustment play an important role in our analysis, so that this ap-
pendix discusses aspects of the DKW modeling of these costs and the relationship
to conventional modeling of nonstochastic adjustment costs in models of investment,
labor demand, and so on. It is convenient to start by thinking about the adjustment
process as though there were just one vintage, with a ﬁrm considering whether to
stay with its preset price and earn v or to adjust and earn v0.
B.1 A direct adjustment cost interpretation
Panel A of Figure 15 displays one vision of the adjustment cost structure: it displays
the costs to the owner of a portfolio of ﬁrms, under the assumption that a fraction
of ﬁrms α adjust. As is conventional, there are positive, increasing, and convex labor
costs of adjustment, which we call Ξ(α).
If the portfolio owner is equating the marginal cost of increasing the rate of ad-
justment α by a small amount, faces a wage rate of w, and has a gain of v0 − v,
then
wξ(α)=[ v0 − v] (8)
is the relevant eﬃciency condition, where ξ(α)=Ξα is the marginal labor cost of
adjustment. This marginal adjustment cost is shown in panel B of Figure 15.
Linear approximation of the condition ξ(α)=v0−v
w then indicates that the slope






Thus, as is conventional in adjustment cost settings, it is Ξαα = ξα, which is relevant
for the local behavior of adjustment rate response, i.e., the second derivative of costs









































D. CDF of AC: G(ξ)
α
ξ
Figure 15: Adjustment costs leading to a nearly quadratic hazard
44B.2 Stochastic adjustment costs based on a cdf
Next, suppose that adjustment costs are stochastic and idiosyncratic across ﬁrms,
being governed by a cumulative distribution function G(x) on the interval 0 ≤ x ≤ B
and suppose also that the density function is g(x). The truncated mean level of





This measure has two interpretations. First, as in the previous section, it can be
interpreted as the adjustment costs paid by a holder of a portfolio of ﬁrms if the
largest adjustment cost is ξ. Second, it gives the expected value of an individual
ﬁrm’s adjustment costs if there is an adjustment rule that speciﬁes that ξ is the highest
adjustment cost paid by any adjusting ﬁrm. This is an unconditional expectation,
in the sense that it does not take into account information about whether the ﬁrm
adjusts or not, but simply recognizes that adjustment costs are paid only in some
situations (i.e., the form of the adjustment rule that truncates the distribution).















Further, the sensitivity of the response of the adjustment rate to v0−v
w is determined
by density of adjustment costs, i.e.,




This is the vision of adjustment costs developed in Caballero and Engel [1999] and
Dotsey, King, and Wolman [1999]. Both of these analyses specify a distribution of
"ﬁxed costs of adjustment" and develop the implications for that assumed distribu-
tion. However, there are considerable diﬀerences in the assumed distributions, with
Caballero and Engel [1999] using a distribution close to that shown in Figure 15 and
DKW using one that is closer to Figure 16 below.
45B.3 Stochastic adjustment via the cost function
We now consider the relationship between these two approaches. In line with Figure
15, we could specify an inverse cdf
ξ = F(α)
and associated function f(α)=Fα(α). Since the inverse cdf (or marginal adjustment
cost function) is deﬁned by the requirement that
ξ = F(G(ξ))
and its derivative thus satisﬁes 1=FαGξ = f(α)g(ξ).
Above, we discussed the total adjustment cost function in Figure 15. We also said





We now show that these two alternative deﬁnitions of total cost Ξ are the same as
af u n c t i o no fα. To begin, use the change of variables x = F(a);g(x)= 1
F0;a n d





That is: the truncated mean is just the area under the inverse cdf function and the
truncated mean is also the relevant measure of total adjustment costs.
Further, as above, eﬃcient adjustment implies that ξ(α)=v0−v
w so that the
slope of the marginal adjustment cost curve relevant for the dynamic response of






Again, the interpretation is that the adjustment rate responds most strongly when
the density of adjustment costs is largest.
Given the above, we look again at Figure 15, emphasizing four aspects of the
ﬁgure. First, panel A shows the level of adjustment costs, the truncated mean Ξ(α).
Second, the rate of adjustment is determined by the inverse cdf, F(α). Hence, since
eﬃcient adjustment involves ξ(α)=v0−v
w ,t h i si n v o l v e sv a r i a t i o n sa l o n gt h ei n v e r s e
cdf. Third, the extent of response to variations in v0−v
w is governed by the slope of
the inverse cdf (or cost function). Fourth, the cdf itself is shown in panel D.28
28For any cdf, the associated “adjustment cost function” Ξ(α) is positive, increasing and convex
for α>0.T h a ti s :Ξ > 0, Ξα> 0,a n dΞαα > 0, with the third condition being guaranteed by the
fact that Ξαα =1 /g > 0.
46B.4 Extension to multiple vintages
Now, as in our main analysis, we consider the extension to multiple periods of price
ﬁxity. The results above enter our analysis in two ways. First, the expected value of
a ﬁrm depends on its expected future adjustment costs,
















Second, the labor devoted to price adjustment in a particular bin is given by
Ξjθj
and total adjustment costs are np =
J X
j=1
Ξjθ. Third, the possibility that there are
multiple bins now raises a new set of issues concerning the interaction between the
steady-state and the nature of adjustment. In a stationary state, there must be
increasing adjustment rates, such as illustrated in Figure 15, which are consistent
with the requirements ξ(αj)=
v0−vj
w and the value function recursions (9) above.












which is also the density of adjustment costs, as the ﬁnal equality stresses. In a
multiple vintage approach, it is accordingly the case that the properties of the cdf
matter at various points: it is g(ξj) that enters in the response above rather than
g(ξ).
B.5 Approximate Calvo
In the test, we want to explore the eﬀects of state dependence within a battery
of models that have an approximate Calvo form, i.e., a steady-state hazard that is
roughly constant for a number of periods. Accordingly, we select the parameters of
our cost function so that there is a ﬂat hazard for the DS-global setting for eight
quarters, which is a “truncated Calvo” steady-state. Figure 16 displays the nature
of the adjustment costs necessary for this result. In panel B, we see that the necessary
cost function, ξ(α), is one that is fairly ﬂat until α = o.2 then rises very sharply to
close to the maximum cost. Faced with this adjustment cost, ﬁrms with a range of
diﬀerent values of (v0−vj)/w0 will all choose α = o.2.W h e n(v0−vj)/w0 ≥ B =0 .015,
all ﬁr m sw i l lc h o o s et oa d j u s t( α =1 ).
B.6 Functional form
The inverse tangent (or arctangent) is a monotonically increasing function that maps







































D. CDF of AC: G(ξ)
α
ξ
Figure 16: Adjustment costs leading to near constant hazard (α ≈ 0.2).
48shaped pieces. Hence, an inverse cdf that selects part of this function can be used to
explore a variety of diﬀerent assumptions about the cost function within a common
functional form.
We proceed as follows. First, we select a part of the standardized arctangent
s(x)— shown in Figure A1—that we would like to use, i.e., an interval (x,x). Then, we
assume that
x(α)=( x − x) ∗ α + x
where α is restricted to range 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Finally, we assume that the inverse CDF
takes the form
ξ(α)=K1s(x(α)) + K2
We further assume that the inverse CDF takes on a zero value at α =0and a value
of B at α =1 .T h a ti s :
0=K1s(x)+K2
B = K1s(x)+K2







B.6.1 Evaluating the conditional mean
To evaluate Ξ, we proceed as follows. First, the fact that
Z
tan−1(z)dz = z ∗
tan−1(z) − 1
2 ln(1 + z2) implies that
Z


























[ln(1 + (αb + x)
2) − ln(1 + (x)
2)] + K2α
We use this to compute the extent of adjustment costs Ξ.
49B.6.2 Marginal adjustment costs
The linearizations require the derivatives of the adjustment cost functions above. The























1+( α ∗ b + x)2
using the fact that d
dx tan−1(x)=1 /[1 + x2].
B.6.3 Calculating the CDF
T h ef o r mo ft h ei n v e r s eC D Fo rc o s tf u n c t i o nm a k e si te a s yt od e t e r m i n et h ef o r mo f










The density can be readily calculated using d











By appropriate choices of the range of the parameters above, we can replicate a variety
of cdfs or cost functions. Figure 17 displays three selections (the parameter choices
for “nearly Calvo” fall outside of the plotted range, with x = −50 and x =2 0 5 ).
The implied adjustment cost functions (with B=0.15) are plotted next: the hori-
zontal axis is α and the vertical axis is ξ(α).
For additional details on adjustment cost selection, see the replication materials
for this project, which are available at http://people.bu.edu/rking/, speciﬁcally
the documentation on adjustment cost utilities.
C Dynamics of adjustment rates
T h ea d j u s t m e n tr a t ef o raﬁrm of vintage j is implicitly given by ξ(αjt)w0t = v0t−vjt.





] ∗ [log(pjt) − log(pj)] + other terms













































Figure 18: Alternative adjustment cost functions (inverse CDFs)




































Figure 19: Eﬀects of relative price on adjustment rates
so that it is possible to explore the eﬀects of the price level on adjustment incentives,
holding ﬁxed other factors. Speciﬁcally, we take the equilibrium solution for log(pjt)−
log(pj) and then construct a synthetic series e αjt−αj using the equation above. Given
these synthetic series, we can also construct a synthetic series for the vintages, e ωjt−ωj,
which is a dynamic simulation of sorts, since it obeys the dynamic equations
e ωjt − ωj =( 1 − αj)(e ωj−1,t−1 − ωj) − ωj−1(e αjt − αj)
e ω0t − ω0 =
J−1 X
j=0
[αj(e ωj−1,t−1 − ωj)+ωj(e αjt − αj)].
That is, the synthetic series for e ωjt is constructed solely on the basis of variations in
the synthetic adjustment rates {e αjt}j,t, so that it too involves only the eﬀects of pjt.
The striking results of this analysis are reported in Figures 19 and 20. Figure
19 shows that the eﬀects of pjt are dominant on αjt except for those ﬁrms that just
adjusted, with this exception seeming plausible on the basis of our prior analysis of
static proﬁtg a i ni nt h em a i nt e x t . T h ep r i c ee ﬀects capture variations in vintage
fractions (ωjt) virtually completely.


































Figure 20: Eﬀects of relative prices on vintage fractions
DC o m p u t a t i o n
There are two parts to the computation of the model. Consider that the model is a
set of equations of the form
EtF(Yt+1,Y t,X t+1,X t)=0
where Yt is a vector of endogenous variables and Xt is a vector of exogenous variables.
D.1 Computation of stationary point
The stationary point of the model involves ﬁn d i n gav e c t o rY , given a vector X,s u c h
that
F(Y,Y,X,X)=0
Additional discussion to be added.
D.2 Computation of local approximation
The local approximation takes the form
F1 ∗ Et(Yt+1 − Y )+F2(Yt − Y )+F3Et(Xt+1 − X)+F4(Xt − X)=0
where the Fi are matrices of partial derivatives. We compute those matrices analyti-
cally and numerically, oﬀering a cross-check on the dynamic system’s approximation.
54E Model equations
This appendix spells out the complete set of equations of our model. The discussion
is divided into seven blocks of equations governing: (1) the dynamics of the price
distribution; (2) the behavior of relative prices, relative demand and the price level;
(3) cost, proﬁt, and labor demand; (4) consumption demand and labor supply; (5)
ﬁrm value, eﬃcient pricing, and eﬃcient adjustment; (6) deﬁnitions and aggregate
consistency conditions; (7) decomposition of price adjustment dynamics.
E.1 Dynamics of the price distribution
The ﬁrst block of model equations describes the evolution of the price distribution,
including the dynamics of lagged relative prices; the dynamics of the "end of period"
distribution (ω); and (iii) the start of period distribution (θ).
1A. Evolution of lagged relative prices
pj+1,t+1 = pj,t (1.A)





1C. Relate omegas to thetas and alphas
ωjt =( 1− αjt) · θjt for j =1to J − 1 (1.C)
1D. Next period thetas in terms of current omegas
θj+1,t+1 = ωjt j =1to J − 1 (1.D)
55E.2 Relative demand, relative prices, and the price level
The second block determines the current relative prices, current relative demands, the
price level, and a related demand multiplier. Given the lagged relative prices, many
current relative prices evolve based on the extent of inﬂation. Relative demands
depend on these current relative prices in ways that are governed by the aggrega-
tor speciﬁcation, which also imposes restrictions on the price level and the related
multiplier.








j =1to J − 1 (2.A)
2B. Deﬁne relative demand
yt(i)=xt(i) · yt j =0to J − 1 (2.B)
2C. Determinants of demand fractions









[(1 + η)x(i) − η]
γ +1









where Z is the multiplier on the constraint.




































2D. Price level restriction















2E. Aggregate multiplier restriction





57E.3 Cost, proﬁt, and labor demand
The third block involves production, cost, proﬁt and labor demand speciﬁcations
3A. Production fuction/labor demand
The prodution function is a simple linear expression, which also governs labor
demand when prices are sticky,
y(i)=an(i) for j =0to J − 1 (3.A)
3B. Marginal cost





for j =0to J − 1 (3.B)
3C. Proﬁts









xjtyt = pjtyjt − wjtnjt (3.C)
for j =0to J − 1
3D. Marginal proﬁt equations
Marginal proﬁts enter in pricing eﬃciency conditions and these take the form





where sjt is the slope of the demand curve. This expression involves only one marginal
cost term if the factor market is global, since ψjt = ψt in this case.
3E. Demand slopes















58E.4 Consumption demand and labor supply
The fourth block involves consumption demand, labor supply, and various labor ag-
gregations.































4A. Marginal utility of consumption
c
−σ

















where labor supply is the sum of labor in production and labor in price adjustment.
If there is a local labor market, then there is a labor supply equation that is







Adjusting ﬁrms must hire labor to adjust prices, so that the labor supply speciﬁ-











φ (4.C local, bin 0)






θjtΞjt = ΞJt +
J−1 X
j=1
θjt(Ξjt − ΞJt) (4.D)











































E.5 Firm value, eﬃcient pricing, and eﬃcient adjustment
The ﬁfth block involves ﬁrm value functions, marginal conditions for pricing and
eﬃcient adjustment, and a deﬁntion of the marginal value of having a higher price.
5A. Value function recursions
The value function recursions are deﬁned in marginal utility units to make them
easier to approximate.




























5B. Marginal value recursions














































5D. Expected adjustment costs





61E.6 Aggregate deﬁnitions and consistency conditions
6A. Aggregate demand












6E. Lagged price level
The accounting relationship is
P
L
t+1 = Pt (6.E)










E.7 Decomposition of adjustment dynamics
The equations in this section are based on various analytical approximations described
in appendix D.
7A. Linear price level
As its name suggests, the linear price level is a linear aggregation of the existing










7C. The eﬀects of relative price on adjustment rates
ξα(αj)(e αjt − αj)=−[
pj∂vjt/∂pjt
w0
] ∗ [log(pjt) − log(pj)] + other terms (7.C)
7D. Restriction on the synthetic ex post fractions
J−1 X
j=0
(e ωj,t − ωj)=0 (7.D)
7E. Evolution of the synthetic ex post fractions
e ωjt − ωj =( 1− αj)(e θj−1,t−1 − θj−1) − θj−1(e αjt − αj) (7.E)
7F. Evolution of the synthetic ex ante fractions
e θjt − θj = e ωj−1,t−1 − ωj−1 (7.F)
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